Introduction: Governing Wicked Problems by Ruhl, J. B. & Salzman, J.
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law 
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Introduction: Governing Wicked Problems 
J. B. Ruhl 
Vanderbilt University Law School 
J. Salzman 
UCLA Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. B. Ruhl and J. Salzman, Introduction: Governing Wicked Problems, 73 Vanderbilt Law Review. 1561 
(2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1190 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
       
 
1561 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 









INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1562 
I.   THE ROOTS OF WICKED PROBLEMS THEORY ..................... 1565 
A.  Goal Formulation .................................................. 1567 
B.  Problem Definition ................................................. 1568 
C.  Open Systems ......................................................... 1569 
II.   THE FIRST GENERATION OF WICKED PROBLEMS  
THEORY ............................................................................. 1570 
A.  Refinements ........................................................... 1571 
B.  Extensions .............................................................. 1573 
C.  Critiques ................................................................ 1574 
III.  THE SECOND GENERATION OF WICKED PROBLEMS  
THEORY ............................................................................. 1575 
 
 * David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Program on Law and 
Innovation, and Co-director, Energy, Environment and Land Use Program, Vanderbilt University 
Law School. 
 ** Donald Bren Distinguished Professor of Environmental Law, joint appointment with the 
University of California, Los Angeles Law School and the Bren School of Environmental Science 
& Management, University of California, Santa Barbara. We are thankful to the Vanderbilt Law 
Review for organizing the 2019 Symposium on Governing Wicked Problems and for inviting  
us to assist, and to the participants in the Symposium for their insightful presentations and  
written contributions. 
        
1562 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:6:1561 
IV.  THE NEXT GENERATION OF WICKED PROBLEMS  
THEORY ............................................................................. 1577 
A.  Wicked Problem Theories ....................................... 1578 
B.  Wicked Problem Challenges ................................... 1579 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1581 
INTRODUCTION 
“Wicked problems.” It just says it all. Persistent social 
problems—poverty, food insecurity, climate change, drug addiction, 
pollution, and the list goes on—seem aptly condemned as wicked. But 
what makes them wicked, and what are we to do about them? 
The concept of wicked problems as something more than a 
generic description has its origins in the late 1960s. Professor Horst 
Rittel of the University of California, Berkeley, Architecture 
Department posed the term in a seminar to describe “that class of social 
system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is 
confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with 
conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are 
thoroughly confusing.”1 Rittel and his colleague Melvin Webber later 
refined the concept in a 1973 publication, Dilemmas in a General Theory 
of Planning,2 in which they developed their now-famous list of ten 
distinguishing properties of wicked problems:  
 
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.  
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule. 
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-
or-bad. 
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a 
wicked problem. 
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; 
because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, 
every attempt counts significantly.  
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or 
exhaustively desirable) set of potential solutions, nor is there 
a well-described set of permissible operations that may be 
incorporated into the plan.  
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 
 
 1. C. West Churchman, Wicked Problems, 14 MGMT. SCI. B-141, B-141 (1967) (describing 
Rittel’s seminar discussion). Churchman’s short guest editorial is the first mention in the 
literature of the term used in this sense. 
 2. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 
POL’Y SCIS. 155 (1973). 
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8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of 
another problem.  
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked 
problem can be explained in numerous ways. The  
choice of explanation determines the nature of the  
problem’s resolution.  
10. The planner has no right to be wrong.3  
 
The concept and, in particular, “The List,” as it might be called, 
has caught on. By 2019, their article had been cited in 2,969 Web of 
Science publications spanning a diverse array of disciplines.4 
Environmental science and policy categories dominate the citations,5 
but significant numbers are found in articles covering subjects such as 
urban planning, public administration, economics, engineering, 
computer science, art, and many others.6 Legal scholars have also 
gravitated to the concept of wicked problems, mentioning it in over four 
hundred law journal articles (most of which are not in the Web of 
Science collection) and covering a broad span of topics including the 
opioid crisis, food waste, pollution, state fragility, water resources, 
discrimination, land development, and many others.7 
 
 3. Id. at 161–67. 
 4. Catrien J.A.M. Termeer, Art Dewulf & Robbert Biesbroek, A Critical Assessment of the 
Wicked Problem Concept: Relevance and Usefulness for Policy Science and Practice, 38 POL’Y & 
SOC’Y 167, 168 (2019).  
 5. Id. Environmental studies, environmental sciences, environmental engineering, green 
sustainable science technology, ecology, and water resources combined account for 1,175 of the 
citations. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See generally Sam Bateman, Solving the “Wicked Problems” of Maritime Security: Are 
Regional Forums Up to the Task?, 33 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 1 (2011) (arguing that many of the 
problems related to the maritime security environment of the Asia Pacific are wicked problems); 
Matthew Burris, Thinking Slow About Sexual Assault in the Military, 23 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 21 (2015) (arguing that the prevalence of sexual assault in society at large is a wicked 
problem); Nathalie J. Chalifour & Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, The Carrots and Sticks of 
Sustainable Farming in Canada, 17 VT. J. ENV’T L. 303 (2016) (arguing that achieving sustainable 
farming is a wicked problem because of the difficulty in making farmers internalize the cost); 
Stephen R. Miller, Planning for Wildfire in the Wildland-Urban Interface: A Guide for Western 
Communities, 49 URB. LAW. 207 (2017) (arguing that wildfire response can be thought of as a 
wicked problem); Sarah J. Morath, Regulating Food Waste, 48 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 239 (2018) (arguing 
that food waste in America is a wicked problem because it requires a comprehensive and 
systematic solution); Gregory S. Parks & Sarah J. Spangenburg, Hazing in “White” Sororities: 
Explanations at the Organizational-Level, 30 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 55 (2019) (arguing that 
hazing has been difficult to curtail because the institutions policing it have not addressed it as a 
wicked problem); Sue Swenson & Charlie Lakin, A Wicked Problem: Can Governments be Fair to 
Families Living with Disabilities?, 63 FAM. RELS. 185 (2014) (labeling the difficulty in managing 
government aid to those with disabilities a wicked problem); Nicolas P. Terry, Structural 
Determinism Amplifying the Opioid Crisis: It’s the Healthcare, Stupid!, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 315 
(2019) (arguing that the healthcare system in the United States and the opioid crisis are  
wicked problems). 
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To a large extent, however, the fame of Rittel and Webber’s ten-
point list has overshadowed the deeper governance theory they 
developed in their article. The vast majority of the publications citing 
Rittel and Webber’s article do so simply to adopt the concept of wicked 
problems, with a quick sentence or two about what Rittel and Webber 
had in mind about wickedness (often with The List set out), to fit the 
problem under consideration into that category of social problems.8 It is 
as if without the prefix “wicked” a problem is not worthy of  
scholarly attention.  
This is overwhelmingly the pattern in legal scholarship: the 
author claims a social problem is a wicked problem, cites Rittel and 
Webber, and that is the last we hear of them and of the concept. Only 
on rare occasion do legal scholars leverage Rittel and Webber more 
comprehensively, and even then it is usually to crunch through the ten 
characteristics rather than engage their broader commentary on the 
challenges of modern governance.9 The small subset of articles 
grappling with the wicked problems concept as part of a theory of 
governance appears mainly in policy science and planning journals.10  
The purpose of this Article is to close that gap—to provide in 
legal scholarship a concise summary of wicked problems theory from its 
roots in Rittel and Webber’s article through its evolution in policy 
science and planning scholarship. Not coincidentally, this sets the stage 
for introducing the theme of the Vanderbilt Law Review’s 2019 
Symposium, Governing Wicked Problems, and the other articles in this 
Symposium issue.  
The Symposium explored three key questions: Where do we go 
from here with wicked problems theory? Is there anything to be learned 
about governing wicked problems from governance theories that have 
gained traction since Rittel and Webber’s article, such as resilience 
theory and adaptive governance theory? What insights are there for 
wicked problems in the twenty-first century, such as climate change, 
biodiversity loss, evolving technologies, and lack of affordable urban 
housing, which all seem to be rapidly increasing in their “wickedness”? 
We develop these themes in four parts. Part I of the Article goes 
back to the roots of wicked problems theory to unpack what Rittel and 
 
 8. As one commentary puts it, many references to the article “entail little more than 
namedropping a buzzword to attract attention.” Termeer et al., supra note 4, at 176. 
 9. See, e.g., Sharon Lewis, The Tissue Issue: A Wicked Problem, 48 JURIMETRICS 193 (2008) 
(working through the criteria for purposes of regulation of human body tissue); Alan Z. 
Rozenshtein, Wicked Crypto, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1181 (2019) (arguing that balancing privacy 
and security concerns in regard to the accessibility of encrypted data is a wicked problem). 
 10. See infra Parts II and III (discussing the first and second generations of wicked problems 
theory literature). 
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Webber had to say about governance of social problems in the latter 
stages of the twentieth century. Part II traces the evolution of wicked 
problems theory over the following forty years under three broad 
categories: refinements to the original theory, extensions of the original 
theory, and critiques. Part III describes the “second generation” of the 
theory, examining how the modern theories of complexity science and 
evolving governance systems sharpen our understanding of wicked 
problems scholarship. Part IV provides summaries of the contributions 
to this Symposium issue. 
Whether called “wicked” or not, there is a growing sense that the 
social problems of our future are rapidly growing more complex. 
Reaching global scales, they are increasingly fragile to cascade failure. 
Intertwined in vast social-ecological-technological systems, they seem 
out of control. This Symposium issue was convened with the clear 
understanding that new ways of thinking about social problems and 
their governance are needed now more than ever.    
I. THE ROOTS OF WICKED PROBLEMS THEORY 
The wicked problems concept is about more than a list of ten 
maddening features of complex social problems. Rittel and Webber were 
writing in the early 1970s, which witnessed rising polarization in 
American politics in realms such as the environment, the military, 
urban renewal, women’s rights, welfare, policing, and race relations.11 
As planners, they were focused on the changing role and status of the 
broader class of professionals in society, which they saw as in transition 
from solving definable, understandable, and consensual social problems 
to hammering away at problems mired in contested goal formulation, 
problem definition, and equity issues.12 The tools and competencies 
professionals used to solve the “tame” problems of prior eras drew from 
scientific methods, rational choice inquiry, operations research, and 
efficiency analysis, and their successes with these tools elevated the 
stature of professionals and their methods.13 It was an impressive 
record. As Rittel and Webber put it, the streets had been paved, roads 
connected, housing built, dread diseases controlled, clean water 
 
 11. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 155–56. 
 12. Id. at 156. 
 13. Id. at 156, 160. 
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supplied, sanitary sewers installed, and so on—all to the benefit of 
society and to the reputation of professionals.14  
But by the 1970s, the public and private clients of professionals’ 
expertise had grown restive, voicing “ever-louder public protests 
against the professions’ diagnoses of the clients’ problems, against 
professionally designed governmental programs, against professionally 
certified standards for public services.”15 Rittel and Webber posited that 
this backlash was due to two factors. First, with the “tame” problems 
solved, there was growing social awareness that not nearly as much 
progress had been made on problems that were more complex and 
systemic. Second, these kinds of problems exposed a “growing 
awareness of the nation’s pluralism and of the differentiation of values 
that accompanies differentiation of publics.”16 These two forces led to 
more and more societal process having “the character of zero-sum 
games. As the population becomes increasingly pluralistic, inter-group 
differences are likely to be reflected as inter-group rivalries of the zero-
sum sorts.”17  
As a consequence, professionals were becoming less successful 
at solving problems, or even at satisfying most clients that they were 
making progress. Whereas “tests for efficiency . . . were once so useful 
as measures of accomplishment,” they were being replaced “by a 
renewed preoccupation with consequences for equity.”18 The 
“interacting open systems” in which emerging complex social problems 
operated were increasingly resistant to “the professionalized cognitive 
and occupational styles that were refined in the first half of [the 
twentieth] century.”19 In short, as national consensus on social goals 
and the problems facing them eroded, professionals found themselves 
in a moment of crisis. 
Almost fifty years later, what are our nation’s goals today? What 
are the problems we face? What are professionals supposed to do about 
them? Is there more consensus on those questions today than when 
Rittel and Webber wrote in 1973? That is, of course, intended as a 
rhetorical question. There is no societal consensus on our problems or 
solutions. This would have come as no surprise to Rittel and Webber, 
who have proven to be quite prescient in their take on the role of 
 
 14. Id. at 156. 
 15. Id. at 155. 
 16. Id. at 156. 
 17. Id. at 168. 
 18. Id. at 156. 
 19. Id. As planners, Rittel and Webber had in mind the academic debate underway at the 
time over “the rational choice assumptions embedded in comprehensive planning approaches to 
societal problems.” Termeer et al., supra note 4, at 170. 
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professionals in governance. They predicted this state of affairs in their 
assessment of goal formulation, problem definition, and the modern 
“open systems” social context of wicked problems. 
A. Goal Formulation 
Rittel and Webber characterize goal finding as one of the central 
functions of planning and policy,20 suggesting that “the search for 
explicit goals was initiated in force with the opening of the 1960s.”21 
Indeed, they make reference to President Eisenhower’s 1960 
Commission on National Goals, which identified fifteen goals as 
objectively the right goals.22 That was the first and last such 
commission. Rittel and Webber argued that with the rising pluralism 
in Western democracies, that kind of “[g]oal-finding is turning out to be 
an extraordinarily obstinate task.”23 American optimism in progress 
and the goodness of the social order was eroding, yet the planning and 
other social professions refused to concede that “planning for 
betterment” was becoming impossible when the nation could not agree 
about what was better.24 Objective social indicators, reasoning, rational 
discourse, and civilized negotiation were becoming more difficult to find 
and apply as tools for defining goals for perfecting the future. 
Of course, one has to ask what exactly was “the nation” that was 
setting goals in 1960, when Rittel and Webber say it was easier to 
achieve consensus. Every member of the Commission on National Goals 
was a white male.25 It was ostensibly nonpartisan, but the members 
were of only mildly diverse political and socioeconomic orientations.26 
Indeed, in their references to planners and professionals, Rittel and 
 
 20. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 157. 
 21. Id. at 156. 
 22. Id. at 157. The Commission was operated under the auspices of the nonprofit American 
Assembly, housed in Columbia University. See Commission on National Goals, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_National_Goals (last updated Apr. 21, 2020, 14:57 
UTC) [https://perma.cc/E99F-FGHZ] (noting the members of the Commission and the process for 
deciding the fifteen goals). The report was sent to the President in November 1960 and published 
in book form by Prentice Hall in December 1960. See THE AM. ASSEMBLY, GOALS FOR AMERICANS: 
PROGRAMS FOR ACTION IN THE SIXTIES 3–20 (1960). A copy of the original report is available from, 
of all places, the CIA reading room. See THE AM. ASSEMBLY, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GOALS 1 (1960), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP80B01676R000900020006-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3MS-QYDB]. The domestic goals centered 
around promoting equality, democracy, education, economic growth, and individual integrity. Id. 
 23. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 157. 
 24. Id. at 157–58. 
 25. See Commission on National Goals, supra note 22 (click on each member’s name for a 
brief biography). 
 26. See id.  
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Webber use only the male gender.27 Looking back, their suggestion that 
goal formulation was becoming increasingly difficult because “the 
population [became] increasingly pluralistic”28 and because “the high-
scale societies of the Western world [were] becoming increasingly 
heterogeneous”29 speaks volumes about who had a seat at the policy 
formulation table in the 1960s and prior. The population did not change 
nearly as much as the politics. Yet, notwithstanding their limited 
worldview, Rittel and Webber identified the problem with goal 
formulation—it became really hard. It has not gotten any easier.   
B. Problem Definition 
According to Rittel and Webber’s “when planning was easy” 
narrative, when the Commission on National Goals was doing its work 
and its goals were (to them) clear, efficiency was seen as both the 
explanation for and solution to social problems.30 Problems arose where 
efficiency was lacking, and solutions were designed around efficient 
measures that the technically skilled professional could implement 
with the simplified end in mind.31 Why was this perspective  
also unravelling?  
For Rittel and Webber, problem definition requires “knowing 
what distinguishes an observed condition from a desired condition.”32 
Their perceived rise in pluralism made it more difficult to identify 
desired positions, but as social problems increasingly operated in 
“interconnected networks of systems,” it became just as difficult to 
identify observed conditions with any certainty.33 Under those 
conditions, even if desired ends are agreed, planners cannot easily 
locate “where in the complex causal networks the trouble really lies.”34 
Indeed, to a large extent Rittel and Webber attribute this growing 
problem with problem definition to be the result of planners becoming 
more aware of the problems they were being asked to solve. As they put 
it, “as we become more sophisticated about the complex workings of 
open societal systems, it becomes ever more difficult to make the 
planning idea operational.”35    
 
 27. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 162. 
 28. Id. at 168. 
 29. Id. at 167. 
 30. Id. at 158. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 159. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
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C. Open Systems 
When one reads the wicked problems literature, it is easy to get 
the impression that Rittel and Webber simply put The List out there 
without the foregoing context on the erosion of goal formulation and 
problem definition in modern governance. As Termeer et al. suggest, 
“[t]he 10 claims made by Rittel and Webber can . . . be read as a set of 
arguments against purely rational approaches to policy. In the 
subsequent literature, however, these claims have largely been picked 
up as defining characteristics of a particular type of policy 
problems . . . .”36 Perhaps it is better to think of them as both. In 
elaborating on each of the claims, Rittel and Webber devote 
considerable attention to what makes a problem “wicked” as opposed to 
“tame,” yet there is no mistaking that their purpose is to challenge 
rationalism as the method of professionals’ problem-solving.  
To a large extent, The List is self-explanatory with regard to 
each characteristic—the elaborations and examples Rittel and Webber 
provide in the article are for the most part just that. One gets the gist 
of the concept just by reading The List. Stepping back, however, one 
theme dominates throughout the full article as defining both the core 
characteristic of wicked problems and the core challenge to rationalist 
governance—the open system property of wicked problems. Indeed, 
before getting to The List, Rittel and Webber devote a full page of the 
article to their argument that “the classical paradigm of science and 
engineering—the paradigm that has underlain modern 
professionalism—is not applicable to the problems of open societal 
systems.”37 The List, then, is their attempt to define why those open 
systems defy that problem-solving paradigm.  
Every one of the characteristics of a wicked problem Rittel and 
Webber describe thus is an extension or consequence of their conception 
of social problems as operating in “large and interconnected networks 
of systems.”38 This is why “any solution, after being implemented, will 
generate waves of consequences,” some of which could “yield utterly 
undesirable repercussions which outweigh the intended advantages” of 
the solution.39 Ultimately, “[t]he planner who works with [such] open 
systems is caught up in the ambiguity of their causal webs.”40  
It is this overarching property of wicked problems that Rittel 
and Webber use in the final part of their article to return to their 
 
 36. Termeer et al., supra note 4, at 170. 
 37. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 160. 
 38. Id. at 159. 
 39. Id. at 163. 
 40. Id. at 167. 
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primary theme of governance theory in an increasingly pluralistic and 
differentiated society in which there is no longer a unitary public 
welfare (if there ever was).41 This has profound implications for policy, 
as it is possible that “there is no aggregate measure for the welfare of a 
highly diversified society” that is both “objective and nonpartisan.”42 
How, they ask, are governance institutions to manage wicked problems 
in a “planful way” given their open system nature, untraceable 
causalities, and diverse distributional impacts?43 How indeed, one 
might just as urgently ask today. 
As suggested above, Rittel and Webber’s depiction of a world in 
which social problems transformed in the early 1970s from simple to 
open systems perhaps underestimated how open they were before the 
1970s. Political and professional elites just did not see them that way. 
Goals for all of society were defined by a narrow band of society and in 
such a way as to be amenable to technocratic solution actions. 
Regardless, the message Rittel and Webber sent to social professionals 
going forward—that those days were over—was not only on target then, 
but also prescient regarding our present social context.    
The roots of wicked problems theory thus go deeper than The 
List. Rittel and Webber formulated the concept of a wicked problem to 
expose a transition in the methods and metrics of governance from a 
rationalist obsession with efficiency to a pluralistic debate over equity. 
At the end of the day, however, the article proved an anticlimax. The 
authors had no answers for how to move forward, conceding they had 
“neither a theory that can locate societal goodness, nor one that might 
dispel wickedness, nor one that might resolve the problems of equity 
that rising pluralism is provoking.”44 Those theories remain elusive, to 
say the least. 
II. THE FIRST GENERATION OF WICKED PROBLEMS THEORY 
Although many of the citations to Rittel and Webber simply 
attribute the source of The List, there are also more than enough 
publications delving into the meaning of the wicked problems concept 
as a class of problems and its implications for governance.45 Early “first 
generation” contributions generally fell into three categories—
refinements of The List, extensions of The List and its governance 
 
 41. Id. at 168. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 167–68. 
 44. Id. at 169. 
 45. See, e.g., Brian W. Head, Forty Years of Wicked Problems Literature: Forging Closer Links 
to Policy Studies, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 180 (2018) (summarizing the various themes). 
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implications, and critiques of the wicked problems concept. As a recent 
survey concluded, however, “[d]espite many new insights, the 10 
characteristics of Rittel and Webber still dominate the debate.”46 
Nevertheless, it is worth identifying some of the more prominent entries 
in the continuing debate. 
A. Refinements 
Less than a decade after its publication, Rittel and Webber’s 
article was already being described as “the seminal article” on 
intractable social problems.47 Yet, stepping back from it, The List is a 
bit of a jumble, lacking any readily apparent basis for the order and 
number of the attributes. Refinements thus followed in the literature. 
One early and useful such contribution, by Bayard Catron, 
insightfully reorganized the ten attributes around four sets of claims 
having to do with wicked problems: (1) the ontology (their existence), 
(2) the epistemology (our ability to understand), (3) the methodology 
(how we approach them), and (4) the ethics (acting rightly).48 Under this 
rubric, The List would be reorganized as follows:   
 
Ontological claims 
1.  There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.  
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of 
another problem.  
Epistemological claims 
6.  Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or 
exhaustively desirable) set of potential solutions, nor is there 
a well-described set of permissible operations that may be 
incorporated into the plan.  
9.  The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked 
problem can be explained in numerous ways. The  
choice of explanation determines the nature of the  
problem’s resolution.  
Methodological claims 
2.  Wicked problems have no stopping rule. 
4.  There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a 
wicked problem. 
 
 46. Termeer et al., supra note 4, at 170. 
 47. Bayard L. Catron, On Taming Wicked Problems, 3 DIALOGUE 13, 13 (1981). 
 48. Id. at 14–15. 
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Ethical claims 
3.  Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-
or-bad. 
5.  Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; 
because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, 
every attempt counts significantly.  
10.  The planner has no right to be wrong. 
 
Other efforts to categorize the ten attributes include one 
dividing them into problem-related attributes (claims 1, 6, 7, 8, and 9) 
and solution-related attributes (claims 2, 3, 4, and 5), another focusing 
on indeterminacy and irreversibility, and another dividing them into 
claims of complexity, diversity, and uncertainty.49 Despite these 
valuable insights, The List persists in its original order and number 
and is invariably the first version to be referenced by most authors, if 
any others are mentioned at all. 
A different and more influential approach, by John Alford and 
Brian Head, focuses on the degree of wickedness using dimensions of 
the wicked problem concept.50 They divide the wicked problems concept 
into two problems: increasing complexity of the problem and solution, 
and increasing difficulty of achieving stakeholder cooperation.51 “Tame 
problems” operate when those dimensions are at their easiest to 
achieve, and “very wicked problems” are at the opposite extreme, with 
various descriptions of complexity fitting in other boxes of their 
matrix.52 Factors driving problems along the spectrum include 
structural complexity, knowability, knowledge fragmentation, 
knowledge framing, interest differentiation, and power distributions.53 
This approach proves useful in two respects. First, it goes “beyond the 
dichotomous analytical framing of wicked versus tame problems”;54 and 
second, their driver factors offer some explanatory power for assessing 
why wicked problems have the attributes captured in The List.   
 
 49. Termeer et al., supra note 4, at 170 (summarizing these contributions). 
 50. See John Alford & Brian W. Head, Wicked and Less Wicked Problems: A Typology and a 
Contingency Framework, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 397 (2017).  
 51. Id. at 402.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 407. 
 54. Termeer et al., supra note 4, at 170. 
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B. Extensions 
Several influential contributions to the wicked problems 
literature take The List as a given and extend attributes or theory from 
there. Perhaps the most popularized example, by Kelly Levin et al., is 
that of “super wicked problems.”55 Focusing on climate change, they 
append to The List four additional attributes to define a new class of 
problems: (1) time is running out; (2) those who cause the problem also 
seek to provide a solution; (3) the central authority needed to address 
them is weak or nonexistent; and (4) irrational discounting occurs that 
pushes responses into the future.56 These features aptly describe the 
climate change problem.57 But Levin et al. spend little time elaborating 
on them; rather, they develop an insightful theory of forward-looking, 
path-dependent policy interventions designed to overcome the four 
super-wicked attributes.58 Having hitched their list to The List, 
however, their governance theory has to a large extent suffered the 
same fate as Rittel and Webber’s original work—they are cited mainly 
for their list, far less so for their theory.59   
Another frequently cited contribution, by Nancy Roberts, 
leverages Alford and Head’s wickedness spectrum concept to develop a 
theory of “coping strategies” for wicked problems.60 If conflict over both 
problem definition and its solution become high, thus fitting the wicked 
problems class (what Roberts calls Type III problems), Roberts suggests 
three possible governance approaches.61 If power over the solution is 
centralized rather than dispersed (which per Levin et al. would 
disqualify it from being a super wicked problem), authoritative 
strategies can be developed. If power over the solution is dispersed but 
not contested, collaborative strategies can be employed to reach 
solutions. If power is both dispersed and contested, solutions must be 
devised and vetted in competitive strategies, such as politics  
and markets.    
 
 55. Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein & Graeme Auld, Overcoming the 
Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate 
Change, 45 POL’Y SCI. 123, 124 (2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009). 
 58. Levin et al., supra note 55, at 124–49. 
 59. See, e.g., B. Guy Peters, What Is So Wicked About Wicked Problems? A Conceptual 
Analysis and a Research Program, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 385, 388 (2017); Termeer et al., supra note 4, 
at 170.  
 60. Nancy Roberts, Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution, 1 INT’L  
PUB. MGMT. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000), https://journals.sfu.ca/ipmr/index.php/ipmr/article/view/175/175 
[https://perma.cc/QUE8-YKS9]. 
 61. Id. at 3–7.  
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C. Critiques 
Not all wicked problems literature embraces the wicked 
problems concept. Critiques come in two forms—critiques of the concept 
itself and critiques of its use in the literature. 
A recurrent theme in scholarship critiquing Rittel and Webber 
directly is that their tame/wicked dichotomy relies on a “strict, 
ontological demarcation of wicked and tame problems according to the 
branches of science [that] is a serious misconception, and as such very 
misleading.”62 Rittel and Webber did (it seems unnecessarily for their 
purposes) diminish the challenges of the kind of problems the natural 
and engineering sciences solve, which they describe as definable, 
separable, findable, and thus “tame” in comparison to the wicked 
problems planners and other social science professionals confront.63 
Even very early and generally favorable reviews of their article fault 
them for this oversimplification.64 Their central point was that planners 
should stop “mimicking the cognitive style of science and the 
occupational style of engineering.”65 For that, they did not need to 
portray the natural sciences and engineering as confined to tame (albeit 
often very complicated) problems.    
Another criticism of Rittel and Webber is that, although they 
describe the class of wicked problems as part of their “invocation for a 
community of rationalistic researchers to critically reflect on their 
paradigm,”66 they provided no coherent research program for going 
forward. But is this a fair criticism? After all, the title of the article, 
Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, suggests that it was the 
invocation that was their central purpose, not charting a research 
agenda for policy studies. Again, The List seems to have hijacked their 
theory of governance and become the larger focus of such critiques. 
This rings true in the stream of criticism aimed at scholars 
leveraging the wicked problems concept. For example, Guy Peters 
complains that “describing . . . policy problems as wicked problems has 
become a fad in the academic literature,” whereas there is in fact a 
“paucity of problems that meet [the] full definition of a wicked 
problem.”67 Peters also objects that “the concept of wicked problems has 
 
 62. Nick Turnbull & Robert Hoppe, Problematizing ‘Wickedness’: A Critique of the Wicked 
Problems Concept, from Philosophy to Practice, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 315, 318 (2019). 
 63. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 160. 
 64. See, e.g., Catron, supra note 47, at 16 (noting that “the history of science is replete with 
examples of shifts in the way phenomena are perceived and classified”). 
 65. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 160. 
 66. Turnbull & Hoppe, supra note 62, at 320. 
 67. Peters, supra note 59, at 386, 390.  
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taken on a normative element that was not necessarily intended by the 
formulators of the concept,” by which he means scholars insist that 
wicked problems must be solved and centralized, forceful action will be 
required.68 Going further, Mirko Noordegraaff et al. identify three 
themes in wicked problems literature that are open for critique.69 They 
argue that scholars often ignore the microlevel experience of wicked 
problems by people, overstate and even romanticize the extent to which 
cooperation and trust can overcome wicked problems, and offer no 
practical managerial insights.70 In short, wicked problems theory needs 
more modesty in claiming which problems are wicked and a more 
practice-informed orientation for approaching those that are.71 
III. THE SECOND GENERATION OF WICKED PROBLEMS THEORY 
Recent wicked problems literature reveals an emerging “second 
generation” of thought about both the governance challenge Rittel and 
Webber described and the conception of wicked problems.72 For 
example, some scholars posit that complexity science can help inform 
conceptions of wicked problems.73 The focus of complexity science is 
complex adaptive systems—systems “in which large networks of 
components with no central control and simple rules of operation give 
rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information 
processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution.”74 One dominant 
attribute of complex adaptive systems is feedback between the system 
components—the connections through which information flows 
between them to trigger responses.75 “Another important property, 
driven largely by intercomponent feedback, is emergence, the core idea 
of which is that the system exhibits macroscopic behavior that could not 
be predicted by examining the system components, interconnections, 
and interactions at microscopic scales.”76 “A third central property of 
 
 68. Id. at 386. 
 69. Mirko Noordegraaf, Scott Douglas, Karin Geuijen & Martijn Van Der Steen, Weaknesses 
of Wickedness: A Critical Perspective on Wickedness Theory, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 278, 284–85 (2019). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 292. For a summary of critiques of the wicked problems concept, see Termeer et al., 
supra note 4.  
 72. Head, supra note 45, at 183–84; Termeer et al., supra note 4, at 174. 
 73. Head, supra note 45, at 191; Brian Head & John Alford, Wicked Problems: Implications 
for Public Policy and Management, 47 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 711, 724 (2013); Moira Zellner & Scott D. 
Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted Problems: What Can We Learn from Aligning Complex 
Systems and Wicked Problems?, 16 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 457 (2015).  
 74  MELANIE MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 13 (2009).  
 75. See J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal 
Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 228–29 (2015) (describing negative and positive feedback).   
 76. Id. at 229–30. 
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complex adaptive systems is self-organized structure, such that, as 
system scale grows, the system organizes spontaneously (with no 
central controller or plan) around a set of deep structural rules that lend 
stability to the system behavior.”77 These three key system attributes 
produce the dynamics of the underlying system behavior. Alas, they 
also make understanding system behavior—and even more so 
predicting it—excruciatingly difficult.  
Although Rittel and Webber wrote before the development of 
complexity science and its terminology, their article is replete with 
conceptions of governing “open system” problems that resonate directly 
in complexity science. For them, problem-solving could not be separated 
from problems, as “problem-solving action directed to any one node in 
the network . . . induc[es] problems of greater severity at some other 
node.”78 All solution actions are consequential, leaving traces in the 
system that cannot be undone.79 It seems likely that, had Rittel and 
Weber had the tools and language of complexity science at their disposal 
in 1973, they would have embraced them in their characterization of 
wicked problems. It makes sense, therefore, that wicked problems 
theorists have increasingly made that connection as complexity science 
has developed since then.   
There is also increasing connection being made between wicked 
problems and evolving theories of governance, such as adaptive 
management, resilience thinking, collaborative networks, and 
experimentalist governance.80 Having rejected the rationalistic 
premises of traditional planning, Rittel and Webber could find no other 
governance theory substitute at the time. They expressed concern about 
experimental approaches on the one hand,81 and about more cautious 
incrementalist approaches on the other.82 But even those governance 
theories, as developed at the time, were aimed at solving social 
problems. The new wave of governance theories is aimed at managing 
 
 77. Id. at 204. For more on complexity science and its relevance to governing wicked 
problems, see Barbara A. Cosens, J.B. Ruhl, Niko Soininen & Lance Gunderson, Designing Law to 
Enable Adaptive Governance of Wicked Problems, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1687 (2020). 
 78. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 159. 
 79. Id. at 163. 
 80. See, e.g., Ruth DeFries & Harini Nagendra, Ecosystem Management as a Wicked Problem, 
356 SCIENCE 265, 267–68 (2017); Head, supra note 45, at 191–92; Noordegraaf et al., supra note 
69, at 280; Edward P. Weber & Anne M. Khademian, Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges, 
and Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 334 (2008). 
 81. Rittel & Webber, supra note 2, at 163. 
 82. Id. at 165. 
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social problems, recognizing they are inherently complex and subject to 
high degrees of uncertainty.83  
The wicked problems concept has been criticized for its tendency 
to frame problems as so intractable that policy actors are “inclined to 
retreat instead of addressing the problems.”84 But these new paths of 
research leveraging the concept and its governance context suggest that 
work continues on the wicked problems project to both refine the 
description of problems on society’s horizon and to sharpen the 
explanatory capacity of wicked problems theory.85 With such efforts, the 
attributes captured in The List (and the four additions for super wicked 
problems) can become less threatening and more informative about how 
to think about and manage social problems. The articles in this 
Symposium issue tap into these themes, exploring how both new 
theories of governance and new kinds of wicked (and super wicked) 
problems can contribute to that end.  
IV. THE NEXT GENERATION OF WICKED PROBLEMS THEORY 
Twelve leading scholars contributed to this Symposium. While 
all the articles address both theory and practice, their focus falls into 
two groups. Robin Craig, Barbara Cosens and coauthors, and Scott 
Campbell and Moira Zellner focus on how systems theories that have 
developed since 1970 change how we analyze wicked problems. Their 
pieces describe the application of resilience theory, complexity theory, 
causal loop analysis, and ecological panarchy, among others, to the 
challenges posed by wicked problems. Taken together, these provide a 
superb description of cutting-edge theory.  
The second group applies wicked problems theory to the specific 
challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss, zoning, and emerging 
technologies. Interestingly, they all reject core features of the classic 
wicked problems analysis and certain parts of The List. Richard 
Lazarus, Gary Marchant, Alejandro Camacho, Michael Vandenbergh 
and Jonathan Gilligan, and Christopher Serkin call for variants of 
adaptive management, muddling through, or “silver buckshot” 
strategies rather than silver bullets.  
 
 83. See Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014) (proposing that agencies incorporate an “adaptive 
management track” to enhance decisionmaking in select circumstances). 
 84. Termeer et al., supra note 4, at 176. 
 85. Id. at 177. 
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A. Wicked Problem Theories 
In Designing Law to Enable Adaptive Governance of Modern 
Wicked Problems,86 Barbara Cosens and her coauthors explore the role 
of law and government in adaptive governance. Starting from the 
scholarship in systems thinking, the piece argues that framing wicked 
problems as the result of open and interacting systems represents a 
major advance from Rittel and Webber’s more linear scientific 
approach. In particular, they describe the essential facets of complexity 
theory, arguing that seven features of complex systems are the driving 
forces behind modern wicked problems. The article ends with a rejection 
of the traditional strategies of centralized command and control or 
reliance on markets in the face of increasing complexity. The authors 
make a pragmatic call for a “new governance” based on greater 
distributed self-organization through networked governance  
and collaborative governance. They end with specific examples of  
how law and policy can reinforce new governance through  
adaptive management.    
Robin Craig provides a historical perspective. In Resilience 
Theory and Wicked Problems,87 she takes a close look at the particular 
world of Rittel and Webber and explains why their approach was 
appropriate for its time but less directly relevant today. Using the 
framework of social-ecological-systems and resilience theory, she 
situates Rittel and Webber as essentially engineers, realizing that one 
could not calculate solutions to wicked problems on a slide rule. She 
groups The List into two baskets—social capriciousness (social goals are 
always dynamic and contested) and ecological panarchy (systems 
interact with one another in unpredictable ways, increasing 
complexity)—and demonstrates how resilience theory applies to the 
challenge of climate change. She argues that we now commonly accept 
the capricious nature of social change—social, cultural, and political 
diversity is simply a fact of twenty-first century America—and that 
calling this wicked is no longer a useful insight. Instead, she uses the 
idea of “trickster law” to argue that we should focus on the potential of 
resilience theory to guide our governance efforts in taming the 
wickedness of ecological panarchy.  
In Wicked Problems, Foolish Decisions,88 Scott Campbell and 
Moira Zellner focus on the field that spawned the original wicked 
 
 86. Cosens et al., supra note 77, at 1687.  
 87. Robin Kundis Craig, Resilience Theory and Wicked Problems, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1733 
(2020). 
 88. Scott D. Campbell & Moira Zellner, Wicked Problems, Foolish Decisions: Promoting 
Sustainability Through Urban Governance in a Complex World, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1643 (2020).  
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problem theory—urban planning. Planning for cities remains as 
intractable as three decades ago. What has changed, though, is the 
advent of complex systems tools to mitigate and adapt to wicked 
problems instead of reliance on engineering and traditional statistical 
and mathematical analysis. They provide two case studies of current 
urban wicked problems—ecogentrification and megaregional 
sustainability—and use causal loop diagrams to reveal that the 
connections of variables for each case influence behavior of the larger 
urban system. The article explains how application of a complex system 
view, making visible the interconnected forces of an urban system, can 
inform governance with targeted interventions. 
B. Wicked Problem Challenges 
In the Symposium’s keynote presentation and article, The Super 
Wicked Problem of Donald Trump,89 Richard Lazarus revisits his 
influential 2009 publication, Super Wicked Problems and Climate 
Change,90 which was the first law review article to examine climate 
change through the wicked problem framework. His 2009 piece was 
written in anticipation of impending climate legislation and proposed a 
series of “precommitment strategies” to make the measures more 
effective over the longer term. As we now know, of course, no legislation 
was passed. Lazarus explains how the legislation was thwarted and 
how executive authority took the place of congressional action. From 
today’s vantage, he argues that climate change still warrants its wicked 
moniker, made super wicked by the temporal factor that the problem 
gets worse the longer we delay. Turning to the Trump Administration, 
he details efforts to roll back Obama-era climate policies and explains 
how Trump has exploited the super wicked nature of climate change to 
justify these actions—focusing on short-term economic concerns over 
distant harms. At the same time, these rollback options have faced 
significant obstacles through procedural and substantive 
administrative law requirements. Indeed, the Obama-era policies have 
exhibited more precommitment stickiness than expected.  
In De- and Re-Constructing Public Governance for Biodiversity 
Conservation,91 Alejandro Camacho assesses the usefulness of the 
wicked problem framework to loss of biodiversity. He argues that while 
biodiversity loss clearly qualifies as wicked, this description offers little 
 
 89. Richard Lazarus, The Super Wicked Problem of Donald Trump, 73 VAND. L. REV.  
1811 (2020). 
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 91. Alejandro E. Camacho, De- and Re-Constructing Public Governance for Biodiversity 
Conservation, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1585 (2020). 
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practical guidance for how best to conserve species and ecosystems. The 
current approach of permit-by-permit regulation is not working, and 
has proven even more inadequate in the face of climate change. The 
governance system has fragmented into overlapping, independent, and 
decentralized institutions. While some wicked problem analysts 
promote decentralized solutions, this can increase the threat of 
cumulative harms from habitat fragmentation and invasive species. A 
better approach, he argues, should focus on multispecies, ecosystem-
based, and landscape-level planning. Based on his writings with Robert 
Glicksman,92 he calls for a move beyond the focus on procedural 
mechanisms, instead attending more closely to substantive and 
structural legal adaptive capacity, coupled with greater attention to 
ecological health and interventionist strategies.  
Gary Marchant considers the challenge of Governance of 
Emerging Technologies as a Wicked Problem.93 Time and again, 
traditional government regulation has proven inadequate to manage 
the risks of emerging technologies, whether synthetic biology, artificial 
intelligence, or nanotechnology. These technologies are particularly 
wicked because they pose what he calls a “pacing problem” (where 
technology development and commercialization far outpace the speed of 
government, whether through legislation, regulation, or judicial 
review), a jurisdictional problem (where the risks of emerging 
technologies do not neatly fit within the scope of any single agency), and 
the basic uncertainty of novelty. Instead, Marchant employs the wicked 
problem framework to highlight that no single solution exists and that, 
as a result, the ambition for governance strategies should be to 
acknowledge explicitly and promote a mix of substandard governance 
approaches. He develops a 2x2 matrix of policies, ex ante versus ex post 
and permissive versus prohibitive, to contrast the range of governance 
strategies that have been applied to emerging technologies. Each of 
these strategies is clearly inadequate as the sole governance 
mechanism, but Marchant proposes instead a combination of strategies 
among multiple actors with the goals of muddling through and 
implementing imperfect solutions. 
 
 92. See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How 
Program Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 711, 724–34 (2016) (defining the substantive and procedural components of legal adaptive 
capacity); ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT: A 
FUNCTIONAL AND DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK 236–37 (2019) (distinguishing structural legal 
adaptive capacity). 
 93. Gary E. Marchant, Governance of Emerging Technologies as a Wicked Problem, 73 VAND. 
L. REV. 1861 (2020).  
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In Beyond Wickedness: Managing Complex Systems and Climate 
Change, Jonathan Gilligan and Michael Vandenbergh focus the wicked 
problems lens on climate change,94 the same challenge Richard Lazarus 
addressed a decade earlier. They argue that the wicked problem 
framing creates more heat than light, with no positive guidance for how 
to solve wicked problems—“an inescapable Slough of Despond in which 
planners are doomed to failure no matter what they do.” Indeed, they 
charge that wicked problems can serve a rhetorical purpose for interests 
seeking to block progress by encouraging a policy paralysis. They see 
climate deniers using just this tactic to drive delay. This is especially 
concerning because the temporal aspects of wicked problems transform 
them into super wicked problems, where inaction has its own costs. As 
a way out, they promote Lindblom’s approach of “muddling through”—
incremental management of wicked problems that allows midcourse 
adjustments by learning through trial and error. This strategy accepts 
there is no single best policy and a “silver buckshot” approach makes 
more sense than holding out for a silver bullet. The governance strategy 
best suited is one of incremental measures from polycentric governance. 
This strategy is reinforced in Christopher Serkin’s examination 
of The Wicked Problem of Zoning.95 Laying out the challenge of 
seventeen competing goals of zoning—from economic efficiency and 
distributional concerns to environmental protection, morality, and 
private rights—Serkin argues there can be no single answer to the 
problems created by contested land use. He describes the criticism over 
much of zoning policy as one of compromise and whittling away. Serkin, 
however, refutes this criticism as well as The List’s contention that a 
solution must be a “one-shot operation.” Because there is no holistic 
answer possible to zoning challenges, he champions incrementalism as 
an ideally paced approach that balances competing interests while 
respecting expectations and the resistance to fast change. 
CONCLUSION 
In the fifty years since the wicked problems concept first entered 
policy sciences theory and practice, it and The List have demonstrated 
remarkable staying power. Policy scholars have used them, revised 
them, extended them, and rejected them, and yet “wicked problems” 
remain firmly in the policy sciences lexicon and The List is repeated 
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over and over. Why is that? The articles from the Vanderbilt Law 
Review Symposium suggest two reasons.   
First, it is fair to say that Rittel and Webber put the nail in the 
coffin of rationalist, science-based policy theory. Offering nothing in its 
place, however, their article has served as an invitation for others to do 
so and has become a reference starting point. The first group of 
Symposium articles summarized above is representative. Complexity 
science, resilience theory, new governance, causal loops, and panarchy 
theory offer new ways of thinking about governance in the “open 
systems” context Rittel and Webber identified as the root of the social 
challenges the nation faced in the 1970s. These new theories face a 
similar challenge, though. Even if there are no single solutions to 
wicked problems, it is still unclear how best to manage them. Real-life 
applications of these theories remain few and far between. Wicked 
problems are not going away, so we need to focus on how we would 
determine which of the new governance theories warrant 
implementation, or even can be implemented. The theory-to-practice 
gap remains large. 
Similarly, as the second group of Symposium articles 
demonstrates, the wicked problems framing offers a way of unpacking 
and evaluating the practical challenges of policy design and 
implementation for problems like climate change, biodiversity loss, 
technology, and land use. Whether one is “all in” with using the wicked 
problems frame to guide policy implementation or considers it a 
distraction or worse, it remains a useful reference point. Explaining 
what is means to “muddle through,” for example, is made easier by 
using the wicked problems framing, albeit rejecting the implications 
Rittel and Webber spelled out. Again, wicked problems are not going 
away; how to manage them remains open for debate.   
In short, Rittel and Webber have enjoyed thousands of citations 
to their article, and are likely to receive thousands more, because the 
wicked problems concept and its attributes unpacked in The List 
capture the essence of the policy challenges of modern society. The 
wicked problem framing has served as a powerful platform for 
articulating new theories of governance and for describing and 
evaluating policy design and implementation in practice.  
Perhaps the “wicked problem” label and The List are overused 
in this sense—referenced by scholars to position their theory or policy 
subject as having gravitas, but not fully explored. None of the articles 
in this Symposium could be accused of that lack of rigor. Rather, all of 
them demonstrate the value of engaging the wicked problems concept 
and The List more deeply, whether to leverage them or to argue their 
limits and flaws. This issue provides the most comprehensive legal 
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analysis of wicked problems to date. We hope that it spurs further 
research both on the theory of how to manage wicked problems and on 
practical tools to tame these most important and difficult challenges. 
We have no doubt that five decades from this Symposium scholars will 
still be wresting with the best ways to govern wicked problems.  
 
